Squeezing the System: What Happens When You Ask an AI If Greed Rules Politics

by James Wallace Harris, 7/7/26

Lately, I’ve been thinking that greed is the ultimate driver of modern politics in the United States. Is greed a byproduct of evolution? If it is, then how could we control greed politically? I thought these could be good questions to ask my AI, Gemini. I find chatting with an AI to be educational. Many of my liberal friends have big hopes for the 2026 and 2026 elections, but I wondered if their hopes were practical.

This is my second conversation. I had the first conversation with the AI built into Google, but I wasn’t able to save it. I switched to my paid AI, Gemini, and it was helpful to get the conversation formatted in HTML so I could copy it here.

Each gave similar answers but explained in different ways.

I recommend learning to chat with an AI. It makes you think. They also bring up details you haven’t considered. I’m posting this as an example.

I don’t want AIs to think for me. Nor do I want AIs to create content for me. But I do find talking with them educational. It’s like having a dialogue with Socrates.

Jim: Is greed darwinian?

To kick this off, let’s look at this through the lens of evolutionary biology, where “greed” translates to resource hoarding.

From a strict evolutionary standpoint, the short answer is yes, but only up to a point.

In a world of pure scarcity, an organism that secures more food, better territory, or more resources than its peers is simply maximizing its chances of survival and reproduction. If a harsh winter or a drought hits, the individual with the hoard survives, passes on their genes, and the “hoarder” trait continues. In that narrow sense, capturing resources is entirely Darwinian.

However, evolutionary biology throws us a massive curveball when it comes to social species like humans. Pure, unchecked individual greed actually runs counter to another powerful Darwinian mechanism: reciprocal altruism and group selection.

Here is why pure greed fails the long-term Darwinian test for humans:

  • The Cost of No Friends: Humans are physically weak compared to apex predators. Our primary survival strategy has always been the tribe. If an individual in a hunter-gatherer group hoards meat while others starve, the group will ostracize, banish, or kill them. In a social structure, losing the protection of the group is an evolutionary death sentence.
  • Tit-for-Tat (Reciprocity): Evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers demonstrated that cooperation operates on a “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” loop. True greed breaks this loop. If you never share, no one shares with you when your luck runs out.
  • The “Selfish Gene” Nuance: Even Richard Dawkins’ famous “selfish gene” theory explains that genes replicate by making organisms act unselfishly toward their kin. Sharing resources with family ensures the survival of shared genes.

So, while the drive to secure resources is deeply rooted in our evolutionary past, unchecked greed is actually a maladaptive strategy for a social primate. We evolved a fine-tuned radar for fairness and cheating because, for most of human history, hyper-greedy behavior threatened the survival of the whole tribe.


Jim: Let’s rephrase it then. In a capitalistic society, does greed drive competition and determine which laws are made?

In a capitalist framework, greed—often rebranded by economists as rational self-interest—shifts from a basic survival mechanism to the primary engine of the entire system.

When applied to competition and the legal landscape, it operates on two distinct levels.

1. Does Greed Drive Competition?

Yes, it is the primary catalyst, but with a massive catch.

In classic capitalist theory (think Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”), individual self-interest drives people to compete. A business owner wants to maximize profit (greed), so they try to build a better, cheaper product than their rival. This competition benefits society by driving innovation, lowering prices, and increasing efficiency.

However, pure greed also carries the seed of its own destruction regarding competition. If an actor is truly greedy, their ultimate goal isn’t to compete forever—it is to win permanently.

  • The Monopolistic Drive: The most profitable thing a business can do is eliminate competition entirely by creating a monopoly or a cartel.
  • Systemic Stagnation: Once competition is eliminated, innovation stalls, prices rise, and the market stops benefiting the consumer.

So, while greed starts competition, its natural conclusion is to kill competition.

2. Does Greed Determine Which Laws Are Made?

Yes, through a process economists call “regulatory capture.”

In a capitalist society, the immense wealth generated by successful self-interest doesn’t stay insulated in the market; it inevitably flows into the political and legal spheres.

  • Writing the Rules of the Game: Powerful economic actors use their resources (via lobbying, campaign contributions, and public relations) to influence the legal system. They don’t just compete under the rules; they try to rewrite the rules to protect their wealth.
  • Barriers to Entry: Ironically, large corporations often lobby for more regulation, not less, if those regulations are expensive to comply with. This creates a barrier to entry that prevents smaller, innovative startups from competing with them.
  • Externalizing Costs: Greed drives entities to lobby for laws that allow them to maximize profits by shifting their costs onto the public (e.g., pollution, underpaid workers’ healthcare).

Ultimately, laws in a capitalist society often reflect a tug-of-war between the public interest and concentrated economic interest. When the legal system fails to act as a neutral referee, greed effectively dictates the law, shaping it to protect incumbents rather than foster open competition.


Jim: Isn’t private equity investing mainly greed? Isn’t car manufacturers selling only the most expensive models because they make the most profits really just greed?

These two examples highlight exactly how the pressure for short-term profit can make a system look deeply exploitative to the average person. When we strip away the corporate buzzwords, both situations demonstrate what happens when market incentives align entirely with maximizing financial extraction.

Here is how each of these plays out under the hood:

1. Is Private Equity Investing Mainly Greed?

If we define greed as maximizing wealth extraction with little to no regard for human or systemic fallout, then yes.

The core business model of private equity (PE) is to buy companies, “optimize” them, and sell them for a massive profit within a few years. Because PE firms rely heavily on debt to buy these companies—placing the burden of that debt onto the purchased company itself—they are forced to squeeze out cash quickly.

  • The Squeeze: To pay down the debt and hit double-digit returns for investors, PE firms frequently cut labor costs, reduce service quality, strip real estate assets, or raise consumer prices. We see this acutely in sectors like healthcare, nursing homes, and local journalism.
  • The Shield: The PE structure largely protects the investors from the downside. If the acquired company goes bankrupt due to the heavy debt load (as Toys “R” Us did), the PE firm often still walks away with millions in management fees, while workers lose their jobs.

In economic theory, PE is supposed to find inefficiencies and make businesses leaner. In practice, it often functions as an engine that converts functioning community institutions into short-term financial capital for wealthy investors.

2. Are Car Manufacturers Killing Cheap Cars Out of Greed?

Yes, it is a deliberate “profit pivot” that completely abandons the needs of the working class.

For the past several years, major automakers (especially the big American brands) have systematically killed off smaller, affordable sedans and compact cars. They have shifted their factories almost entirely to massive, expensive trucks, SUVs, and high-trim crossovers.

  • The Margins vs. Volume Math: Automakers discovered that the profit margin on a $60,000 fully loaded truck can be $15,000 or more, whereas a $22,000 economy sedan might only net them $1,500. From a pure spreadsheet perspective, selling fewer cars at a much higher price is far more lucrative than selling lots of cheap cars to regular people.
  • “Trimflation”: Even when they do offer base models, they purposefully limit production on them, forcing buyers to choose higher, tech-loaded trim packages that push the average transaction price toward $50,000.

By prioritizing Wall Street’s demand for higher profit margins over the public’s need for basic, affordable transportation, automakers have effectively priced millions of average households out of the new car market entirely, trapping them in high-interest, long-term loans.


Jim: Is it possible to create laws that would be more equitable to the majority and not to just those who have money?

Yes, it is entirely possible to create laws that are equitable to the majority rather than just the wealthy. In fact, a major part of political history is a continuous tug-of-war between concentrated wealth trying to shape the rules and public movements pushing the legal framework back toward fairness.

When a society successfully shifts the legal balance back to the majority, it usually happens through three specific legislative pillars:

1. Insulating the Political System from Money

The most direct way to stop the wealthy from dictating laws is to cut the link between cash and political power. When money is required to win elections, laws naturally bend toward those who have it.

  • Campaign Finance Reform: Forcing strict transparency and placing hard caps on political donations—including banning “dark money” Super PACs—stops wealthy donors or corporations from buying access.
  • Publicly Funded Elections: Some democracies give candidates a fixed pool of public money to campaign with once they qualify, meaning they don’t have to spend their time begging billionaires or corporate interests for funding.
  • Closing the “Revolving Door”: Passing strict laws that ban politicians and regulators from immediately taking high-paying lobbying jobs at the very corporations they used to regulate.

2. Rewriting Market Rules (Antitrust & Corporate Law)

The laws governing how businesses operate are not laws of nature; they are choices. Governments can rewrite corporate guardrails to force capital back toward the public good.

  • Aggressive Antitrust Enforcement: Breaking up monopolies and heavily scrutinizing private equity “roll-ups” (where a firm buys up dozens of small, competing businesses in an area to kill competition and raise prices). By enforcing competition, laws protect small businesses and consumers.
  • Ending Short-Termism: Changing tax and corporate laws so that companies are penalized for prioritizing short-term stock buybacks over long-term investments in worker wages and product safety.
  • Stricter Corporate Liability: Holding corporate executives personally and criminally responsible for systemic fraud, environmental damage, or labor violations, rather than just hitting the corporation with a fine that they treat as a mere “cost of doing business.”

3. Strengthening Collective Power

When individuals stand alone against massive capital, they lose. Laws can be designed to give the majority collective leverage.

  • Labor Protections: Making it legally easier for workers to unionize and collectively bargain. Historically, a strong labor movement is the single most effective counterweight to corporate greed.
  • Consumer Protection Frameworks: Building robust regulatory agencies (like the CFPB or FTC) with the teeth to ban predatory lending, hidden fees, and deceptive pricing outright, rather than relying on consumers to read 50 pages of fine-print legatory terms.

The challenge is never a lack of ideas or legal mechanics; it is a lack of political will. Wealthy interests will always use their resources to resist these changes. Passively waiting for the system to fix itself rarely works—historically, equitable laws are only passed when a highly organized, sustained public movement forces politicians to choose between the voters and their donors.


Jim: What chance would of these changes being made in the current political culture of the United States?

To be blunt: in the current political culture of the United States, the chances of passing sweeping, systemic changes to curb the power of money are very low near-term, but highly volatile long-term.

If we look at Washington today, the system isn’t just stalled by accident; it is operating exactly as it was designed to by the interests that fund it.

To understand why the odds are so long right now, we have to look at three structural barriers dominating our current political landscape:

1. The Supreme Court’s “Free Speech” Iron Wall

Even if Congress miraculously found the political will to pass massive campaign finance reform, it would run headfirst into a judicial brick wall. The U.S. Supreme Court has spent decades cementing the legal doctrine that money equals speech. Following the landmark Citizens United ruling, the Court has consistently struck down attempts to limit political spending. Under the current judicial philosophy, spending unlimited amounts of money to influence an election is protected by the First Amendment. Short of a constitutional amendment or a generational shift in the makeup of the Supreme Court, the legal avenues for major campaign finance reform are effectively blocked.

2. Systematic Congressional Gridlock

The incentive structure in modern Congress actively rewards non-governance. Because of extreme gerrymandering and intense polarization, most politicians are not afraid of losing a general election to the opposite party; they are terrified of being primaried by the most extreme wing of their own party. Furthermore, congressional paralysis has hardened into a routine strategy. Passing major, structural reform requires building broad coalitions. Today, lawmakers face immediate backlash from their donors and media ecosystems for compromising, while obstruction carries almost no political cost.

3. The Power of “Cultural Disruption” as a Smokescreen

When a society is deeply divided on cultural and identity issues, it is very easy for concentrated economic power to maintain status quo economic policies. If a politician wants to protect a private equity firm or a major automaker from regulation, they rarely stand up and say, “I want to protect corporate greed.” Instead, they shift the public conversation to highly emotional culture-war topics. Because voters are hyper-focused on these identity issues, economic consolidation happens quietly in the background with very little unified public resistance.

Where the Chinks in the Armor Are

While federal legislation faces bleak odds, change is creeping in through different, less visible avenues:

  • State and Local Laws: Individual states are increasingly passing their own right-to-repair laws, data privacy protections, and state-level labor rules that push back against corporate consolidation.
  • Executive Agency Action: Federal agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are using existing, century-old laws to launch aggressive antitrust lawsuits against tech giants and corporate monopolies.
  • The Boiling Point: Public frustration with the cost of living, housing, and healthcare is reaching a historic peak. History shows that when the middle class is squeezed tightly enough, it eventually creates an unpredictable political wildfire that can shatter institutional gridlock entirely.

Jim: How likely are any of these changes being made in the 2026 and 2028 elections?

To be direct: the probability of passing any of these structural changes during the 2026 midterms or the 2028 presidential cycle is virtually zero at the federal level. In fact, the legal system is currently moving rapidly in the opposite direction.

Just at the end of June 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered another major blow to campaign finance limits in NRSC v. FEC. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down decades-old limits on how much money political parties can spend in direct coordination with their candidates. This means billionaires can now hand massive checks to political parties, and the parties can act as an alternative checking account for a candidate’s media campaigns.

Because the legal landscape is shifting toward more money in politics rather than less, the 2026 and 2028 cycles will likely be defined by a massive arms race of political spending, making structural reforms highly unlikely.

Here is how the realistic probabilities break down for 2026 and 2028:

1. The 2026 Midterm Landscape: High Friction, No Room for Reform

Midterm elections are rarely moments for deep, structural economic reform; they are usually reactive backlashes against whoever holds the White House. Republicans currently hold a razor-thin majority in the House and a 53-45 majority in the Senate. Even if control of Congress splits or flips by a tiny margin, neither party will have the 60-vote supermajority in the Senate required to bypass a filibuster. Neither party will have the legislative strength to pass sweeping antitrust or campaign finance overhauls.

2. The 2028 Presidential Cycle: Rhetoric vs. Structural Reality

By 2028, public frustration with everyday costs—like the private equity squeeze on housing or automakers eliminating affordable economy cars—will likely become central campaign issues. You will hear an immense amount of anti-corporate rhetoric from both sides in 2028 because that is what voters want to hear. However, even if an administration wins on a platform of economic populism, it will still have to contend with the Supreme Court. Because the Court has dug in on the “money equals speech” doctrine, any new federal law trying to curb campaign finance or corporate influence would likely be struck down within a year of passing.

Where Real Change Will Actually Move the Needle (2026–2028)

While sweeping federal legislation is off the table, the next two years will see major battles fought through alternative channels that don’t require passing new laws through Congress:

  • Executive Trust-Busting: The FTC and DOJ will continue using existing, century-old laws to sue monopolies. The outcome of the 2026 and 2028 elections will decide whether these aggressive antitrust lawsuits against Big Tech, corporate landlords, and healthcare conglomerates are allowed to proceed or are shut down by a new administration.
  • State-Level Rebellion: Because Washington is locked down, states will be the primary battleground. Over the next two years, we will likely see more states bypass federal gridlock by passing localized consumer protection laws, right-to-repair bills, and state-level labor protections.

Ultimately, 2026 and 2028 will not be the years in which these major changes are made. Instead, they will be the years when public frustration builds up even more pressure against a rigid, money-driven system—setting the stage for a much larger political breaking point further down the road.

Jim: Looking at the long term, is there any reason to believe some kind of social/poltical revolution occuring that changes the status quo? Will current politicies cause a tipping point?

Historians, sociologists, and macroeconomists generally agree that long-term status quo changes are inevitable, but they rarely happen through neat, organized policy changes. Instead, history shows that major social and political revolutions occur when a system reaches a structural “tipping point” where it can no longer resolve its own internal crises.

Rather than a single, cinematic explosion, modern researchers view societal tipping points as a slow, systemic erosion of institutional capacity that suddenly accelerates due to an unexpected trigger.

The primary catalysts driving the current status quo toward a long-term tipping point span three major areas.


1. The Biophysical Tipping Point (Climate & Resources)

The most concrete threat to the current global status quo isn’t ideological; it is physical. [6]

  • The “Limits to Growth” Model: Decades of data tracking the famous MIT Limits to Growth study demonstrate that humanity remains locked onto a “Business As Usual” trajectory. This economic model predicts that unchecked exponential growth will result in a structural peak and subsequent decline in industrial output, food production, and welfare.
  • Ecological Cascades: Scientific consensus from the Global Tipping Points Report 2025 warns that human activity has pushed critical Earth systems—such as warm-water coral reefs and major ocean currents like the AMOC—to the brink of collapse.
  • The Political Tipping Point: When environmental degradation causes localized agricultural failure or water scarcity, it triggers mass migration. Historically, sudden demographic shifts and resource competition have severely stressed existing legal frameworks, forcing governments to rapidly adapt or face collapse.

2. Structural Demography (The “Elite Overproduction” Crisis)

Sociologist Peter Turchin utilizes data-driven historical models (Cliodynamics) to predict political instability. His research highlights a repeating historical cycle that triggers revolutions: Elite Overproduction.

  • The Dynamic: In a highly unequal capitalistic society, the education system and economy produce vastly more ambitious, highly educated, and wealthy individuals than there are positions of actual political and economic power (e.g., thousands of law graduates competing for a handful of congressional seats or judicial appointments).
  • The Tipping Point: This creates a massive class of “frustrated elites” who are shut out of the status quo. To gain power, these individuals stop playing by the traditional rules. They weaponize the grievances of the working class, funding grassroots populist movements to intentionally dismantle or rewrite the governing system from within.

3. Technological Disruption (AI and Cognitive Automation)

Historically, revolutions happen when the economic base shifts faster than the political superstructure can manage. The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence represents an unprecedented shift.

  • The Wealth Gap Explosion: If AI automates white-collar and cognitive labor, it will vastly increase corporate profit margins while displacing millions of workers. This creates a hyper-concentration of wealth that the current tax and welfare infrastructure cannot handle.
  • The Friction Point: When a majority of a population realizes that hard work no longer guarantees housing, healthcare, or upward mobility, the psychological contract holding society together dissolves. Distrust in the system peaks, rendering traditional laws unenforceable due to widespread civil non-compliance.

What Does a Modern “Revolution” Look Like?

A 21st-century revolution is unlikely to mirror the French or Russian revolutions with storming palaces. Instead, macro-historians suggest it will take one of three paths:

  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │                           FUTURE SCENARIOS                              │
  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                       │
         ┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
         ▼                             ▼                             ▼
  [ Democratic Renewal ]       [ Neo-Feudal Autocracy ]     [ Networked Regionalism ]
  Mass civic organizing        Corporate elites use         Central government fails;
  forces a "New Deal" style    AI & surveillance to         local communities build
  restructuring of the system. lock down the status quo.    parallel legal/food systems.

  • Democratic Renewal / The Concession Path: Faced with immense civil unrest or the threat of systemic collapse, elites often make massive concessions to save themselves. This is how the U.S. avoided a communist revolution during the Great Depression—by passing the New Deal to redistribute wealth and stabilize the majority.
  • Neo-Feudal Autocracy: If the status quo changes via a right-wing or corporate consolidation, technology could allow elite classes to effectively “lock in” their power. Using algorithmic surveillance, automated policing, and legal control, they can suppress majority dissent far more effectively than historical empires ever could.
  • Networked Regionalism (The “Slow Crumble”): If the federal government becomes completely paralyzed by polarization, power naturally diffuses. States, cities, and regional coalitions will begin ignoring federal mandates, creating their own localized healthcare, environmental, and economic laws, effectively rendering the old national status quo obsolete.

The Verdict

Current policies—specifically the refusal to regulate campaign finance, the failure to address structural climate change, and the lack of a safety net for technological displacement—are absolutely creating the objective conditions for a tipping point.

JWH

Replacing a Bluesound PowerNode 2i with a WiiM Amp Ultra

by James Wallace Harris, 7/6/26

I was quite happy with the Bluesound PowerNode 2i, which I bought years ago. I used it in my bedroom with Klipsch RP-5000F floorstanding speakers. I’d retreat to the bedroom to play music loud and not bother my wife in the front of the house. However, it never sounded as good as my Audiolab 6000A and Polk R600 floorstanding speakers in the den.

The bedroom setup sounded very good, but didn’t produce the big, airy soundstage that I had in the den. Of course, the den is much bigger. I liked its sound so much that I ended up playing my music there more often. My wife said it was okay, but I still worried about annoying her.

Then, when the PowerNode 2i started acting flaky, I thought here was my chance to upgrade the bedroom. The PowerNode 2i still worked, but if I turned it off and then on, it often wouldn’t play music through the speakers, only the subwoofer. I’d have to turn it off and on several times before it would work right. The 2i doesn’t have an on/off switch. Normally, I just leave it on. However, sometimes I wouldn’t use it for days. It would stay warm. And with the subwoofer, I worried about wasting electricity. So I start turning it off at the surge protector. I don’t know if this damaged the 2i.

I thought about buying an Audiolab 6000A for the bedroom, but I’ve seen so many glowing reviews of WiiM products that I wanted to try them. I wondered if what I really liked was the sound of a class A-B amp. The 6000A is twice the price of the WiiM Amp Ultra. I wondered if class D amps had improved in the four years since the 2i came out.

Normally, the WiiM Amp Ultra is $529 at Amazon, but during Prime Day, it was $449. I took that as a sign.

At first, I just swapped speaker cables with the 2i when I set up the WiiM. I also set the crossover for the bass and ran the room correction software. Then I played my first test song. The sound was somewhat better than the 2i, but the soundstage was still small. This disappointed me. I thought of sending it back.

Then I got an idea. I moved the speakers out into the room and further apart. This made a huge improvement. One I was happy with. I had them on six-foot cables. I ordered a set of ten-foot cables and spread them out further. It sounded even better.

Of course, the speakers are in the way. I decided to live with that. I’m the only one who uses this bedroom, and so far, my wife hasn’t seen the setup. I bought some cable covers to protect the speaker cables.

I really like the sound now. It is different from the 6000A. The best way I can describe it is to compare it to working with a photo in Photoshop. The sound from the WiiM feels a tad oversaturated, like oversaturating the colors in a photo. I can change that with EQ, but it’s never as airy as the music from the 6000A. I don’t know if that’s because of the room size or not.

The lesson here is speaker placement and room dynamics. Probably, the PowerNode 2i would have had a larger soundstage if I had moved the speakers out for it. If I wasn’t so lazy, I’d swap the 6000A and WiiM Amp Ultra to see how they sounded in the other room.

The screen on the WiiM Amp Ultra is too small to matter. And I don’t need the phono input or other inputs. I do like the subwoofer support. For the bedroom, all I care about is streaming. I see reviewers on YouTube who claim that if I spend a lot more money, I could get equipment that sounds better than the WiiM. I could test that hypothesis if I tried the 6000A in the bedroom. However, I’m happy enough.

However, I still wonder if those reviewers are right. If I spent $10,000, would I experience music way better than the WiiM? Unless I win the lottery, I’m not going to try to find out.

JWH

The Things That We Love

by James Wallace Harris, 6/27/26

Susan and I just finished watching The Spoils of Poynton, a 1970 BBC production shown on Masterpiece Theater in 1971. It’s based on a 1897 novel by Henry James. Mrs. Adele Gereth has collected art objects, furniture, knick-knacks, lamps, glassware, and pottery for her entire life. Now that her son Owen is of age and will inherit the house and everything in it, she is distraught to learn that his fiancée, Mona Brigstock, lacks the taste and refinement to appreciate her treasure. So Adele connives to get Owen to marry someone else.

This is how things used to be. Families clung to generations of cherished things. Before my mother died, she wanted to know who wanted what of her things. She assumed that Becky, my sister, and I, as well as some of my cousins, would fight over her favorite things. After she died, I took the photo albums, my sister took some homemade quilts, and we gave away everything else.

I’m currently listening to Whistler, the new novel by Ann Patchett. At one point, Jonathan, the husband of the main character, Daphne Fuller, leaves her for several days to return home after his mother’s death to sort through her possessions with his siblings. Daphne begs Jonathan to hire an estate cleanout instead of putting himself through weeks of agony.

When Susan’s parents died, we bought their house because Susan and her brothers were too sentimental to let it go. So we lived with Robert and Mary’s stuff for a very long time. It was actually better than our stuff. And when my friend Janis moved to Mexico, we took in a bunch of her stuff. I think of these people by the things they owned.

All of this makes me think about the things I love to buy and own. Isn’t it weird how we love physical objects so intently? Susan and I are terrible at home decor. Our favorite kind of furniture is the La-Z-Boy. We have six single chairs and one double. We also love large screen TVs. My den has a 65″ TV, and her living room has a 75″ TV. We have hundreds of DVDs. And I have hundreds of CDs. I also have hundreds of books.

I don’t lust after cars, guns, or sports memorabilia like normal guys. I’m a bookworm, and books are what I get all sappy about. Susan says when I die, she’ll call Goodwill and Salvation Army and ask them to haul off everything I loved. Sometimes I think I should help her out by giving most of my books away before I die.

I especially love old science fiction magazines. I’d rather have them than diamonds. I would trade them for 19th-century artwork, but I’m realistic enough to know I’m no art collector. Besides, impressionist artworks really don’t go with La-Z-Boys.

The other day, I watched a YouTube video of the actor Paul Giamatti being interviewed about his book collecting. I felt a great affinity with these two guys. These are my people. I cherish crappy old paperbacks, too.

I always marvel when I visit friends and see how they’ve made their houses into museums of the things they admire. It makes me feel bad that I don’t love beautiful home furnishings. Our decor is functional for watching TV, listening to music, and reading.

After I’ve died, and someone is throwing out my science fiction magazine, I doubt they will see the beauty I saw. They won’t know that every issue of F&SF, Galaxy, or Astounding triggers memories. Most people remember the people they knew and the stories about them. I remember writers and the stories they wrote.

I wish I had a manor house and a lifetime of collected treasures like Adele Gereth, including my library of books and magazines. I love my house, even though it’s junky and cluttered. I do regret not having more refined tastes. But I never cared about dishes or doodads. My grandmother collected figurines of dogs. She had hundreds. That was cool. I wish I had gotten one to remember her by – a collie dog.

In Whistler, Jonathan’s first wife collected paintings of rabbits. I wish I had thought of something like that when I was young. Some kind of modest art that people throwing my stuff away could have identified me with. I’ve always admired 19th-century drawings by naturalists and scientists.

I visit the Friends of the Library bookstore once a week. People donate the kind of things I treasure. In fact, a lot of my treasure came from that bookstore. I think I’ll arrange to give my stuff to them when I die. I’ve already given them thousands of books, records, and CDs over the decades. It makes me sad when I see things I once loved left on the shelves for weeks. Hopefully, they will all find a new home with someone to love them. I guess I’m no different than Adele Gereth.

JWH

Are My Thoughts Like Your Thoughts?

by James Wallace Harris, 6/15/26

In Chapter 3, “Thought” from A World Appears, Michael Pollan works with psychologist Russell T. Hurlburt, who has been collecting thought diaries from his subjects for over fifty years. The technique Hurlburt uses is called Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). Subjects wear a device that randomly beeps in their ears. When they hear the beep, they write down what was going on in their head just before the beep. Hurlburt says:

I have sampled with some people whose inner experience is characterized almost exclusively by inner speech; with others whose inner experience is characterized almost exclusively by images, or by sensory awareness, or by unsymbolized thinking, or by feelings; with others whose inner experience is characterized by a combination of all those; with some whose inner experience is characterized by many simultaneous events; with others whose inner experience is characterized almost exclusively by one event at a time; and so on. So, yes, I think people are importantly different when it comes to inner experience.

So when you ask a person, “What are you thinking?” the answer might not be anything like how you think. For the most part, people assume everyone thinks like they do, but Hurlburt’s research shows that isn’t true.

I’ve kept a running chatter in my head my whole life, except for when I’m unconscious. However, as soon as I wake up, the voice returns. It’s weird to think that some people don’t have this inner voice. That makes me think of the science fiction novel Blindsight by Peter Watts. Watts imagines an intelligent alien race that lacks conscious self-awareness.

My inner voice is almost always analytical, always commenting on what I’m experiencing. If I have a pain in my abdomen, the voice is proposing theories as to what is causing the pain. But it’s not always like this.

When I was younger, I had constant fantasies about everything. I was a little Walter Mitty. I’ve always had imaginary conversations in my head, usually about what I was going to talk about with people in the future. Of course, I had lots of sexual fantasies, but I had many more kinds of fantasies. If I saw a movie and didn’t like the plot, I’d reimagine it with a new plot. If I didn’t like the actors, I’d recast the film in my head. I’ve mentally written hundreds of science fiction stories. For every blog post I write, I’ve already written it several times in my thoughts.

I found it fascinating that Hurlburt said some people don’t do this either.

But then, when I discovered I had aphantasia, my mind boggled trying to imagine how other people see inside their minds. I do sometimes have flashes of visual imagery. My dreams are very vivid. And sometimes if I’m tired in just the right way, I have waking dreams. When I was young and smoked dope, the visual floodgates would open.

I do “visualize” things in my head, but without pictures. I have good spatial awareness and can intuit how machines work. I have another sense for how things look. It’s very hard to describe. I wonder if it’s like how blind people develop spatial awareness?

Hurlburt’s research also showed that people see and think less in their heads as they age. That makes me wonder if I had better mental imagery when I was younger. I do feel my inner chatter is slowing.

One reason I believe that is because when I first tried to meditate in the 1970s, I had a hell of a time quieting that inner voice. Now I can relax, and it will shut up for about as long as I can hold my breath. And it feels like that. The longer I shut up mentally, the pressure builds, sort of like needing to take a breath when you’re holding it. Thoughts eventually explode out.

I’ve often wondered why most people aren’t addicted to music like I am. When I play music, it stimulates my brain in many ways. My “thinking” goes into overdrive, and my mind is flooded with ideas. Also, music creates all kinds of emotions or enhances existing emotions. Music makes me mentally high, but it’s unlike the old marijuana high that made my body high, too. I need to hear one to two hours of music a day, so it does feel like an addiction.

I’m not sure what Hurlburt means by “symbolized” and “unsymbolized thinking.” I might do that, or I might not. Nor do I know what he means by only being able to think of one event at a time. I know I’m experiencing many sensory events at once, but I think I only focus on one at a time. Are some people multichanneled? Is that like having multiple picture-in-picture on your inner TV screen?

I have to assume I’m a bookworm because of the way I think. Reading fiction is like having your own artificial reality goggles. However, I don’t visualize scenes like other readers do.

I assume I write blogs because it feels like I’m organizing my thoughts. I assume that I would think like a writer, say, like Michael Pollan. But the more I read about Hurlburt, the more I wonder.

The fact that there is so much variation from person to person in our modes of thinking is itself an important finding of Descriptive Experience Sampling. Most of us assume that our inner lives must be substantially similar—not necessarily in content but in the form our thoughts take. Hurlburt has suggested that we fail to recognize the diversity of thinking styles because we lump them all together under that single word—thinking—and assume we mean the same thing by it, though in actuality we don’t.

“When a visualizer says they are thinking about something,” Hurlburt said, “they mean they are seeing a visual image of something, and if they are predominantly inner speakers, they mean ‘I was talking to myself.’ And the reason for this, I speculate, is that when you were two and learned that when your mother, or whoever it was, says, ‘I was thinking,’ that meant something that was happening inside Mom that you couldn’t see. So when I want to tell you whatever is going on inside me, that’s ‘I’m thinking.’ But ‘thinking’ means something different from person to person.” If Hurlburt is right, the word thinking has allowed us to overlook these differences and make the unwarranted assumption that other people are having inner experiences more or less like our own.

Pollan, Michael. A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness (pp. 146-147). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Pollan was surprised when Hurlburt expressed what his DES diaries suggested:

Hurlburt proceeded to tell me that he didn’t think I had much inner experience at all. I was on the far end of a spectrum that ran from a rich inner life of words, images, and sensations to one…well, one lacking all that. Apparently, the fact that I had so much trouble distinguishing context from the moments under analysis (and kept bringing up things he considered irrelevant) suggested to him that I was, in effect, backfilling moments empty of actual inner experience.

I was flabbergasted, and reacted a little defensively.

Hurlburt said that he had arrived at his conclusion by a process of elimination: Most of my beeps lacked words, lacked images, lacked sensory awareness. Okay, but what about unsymbolized thinking? My non- or preverbal thought processes seemed to fall neatly into this mode. Hurlburt acknowledged that we had turned up a few instances of this, but “unsymbolized thoughts are complete thoughts,” he explained, not the misty “gists” of thought I had described. Subtract those and he was left with one uncomfortable possibility: that I didn’t have nearly as much of an inner life as I’d always assumed.

My interiority, he seemed to be suggesting, was sparsely furnished.

Has it always been this way? I wondered. Hurlburt pointed out that the ability to generate inner experiences depends on cognitive resources that decline with age. For example, he’s found that as people get older, their inner seeing tends to deteriorate, fading from full-color imagery to black and white. He cited James, who writes that “the older men are and the more effective as thinkers, the more, as a rule, they have lost their visualizing power…. The present writer observes it in his own person most distinctly.” Hurlburt thinks that all forms of inner experience may be subject to the same fading over time.

Pollan, Michael. A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness (pp. 148-149). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Can we know ourselves? Many philosophers and scientists say we can’t understand consciousness because we’re studying it from the inside out. Wouldn’t it be wonderful to step outside of ourselves and study who we are?

It’s quite commonly known that people see colors differently. For example, when I play Rummikub with friends, they claim the green tiles are blue. This is really no different than how different monitors show the same .jpg file with different-looking colors.

This morning, my inner voice was chatting about how we see the world, and asked if machines perceive reality differently. Does a camera see a vista as objective reality? Or are the chemicals in film, and the sensors in digital cameras, also limited by physical constraints?

It is rather weird that we have no idea what reality looks like. And it seems we have no idea what we really look like on the inside.

JWH

The Forsytes on TV

by James Wallace Harris, 6/13/26

Would anyone still be reading John Galsworthy if British television didn’t keep producing new versions of The Forsyte Saga? Galsworthy did win the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1932, the year before he died, but that recognition seldom guarantees an enduring audience.

I must admit I wouldn’t be reading Galsworthy books today if I hadn’t been a fan of all three miniseries based on The Forsyte Saga. Technically, The Forsyte Saga is the title Galsworthy gave to the first trilogy of novels based on the Forsyte family. All nine novels are called The Forsyte Chronicles.

I know it sounds obsessive that I’m reading the books after watching 42 episodes of the three miniseries. However, the novels color in the main characters with greater detail. They also flesh out all the minor characters we see standing around the main characters on the screen.

The literary world has forgotten Galsworthy as a Victorian materialist who didn’t make the evolutionary step to modernism. Virginia Woolf was particularly hard on Galsworthy for failing to portray the inner lives of his characters. We don’t get deep, long stream-of-consciousness narratives, but I do feel Galsworthy describes the inner world of his characters, sometimes explicitly but often implied through dialogue and action.

Soames Foryste, who readers will hate as much as Irene Forsyte hates him, does get our sympathy. Soames is so well developed over six novels that he feels like one of the historical figures Lytton Strachey wrote about in Eminent Victorians.

Personally, I don’t know why Anthony Trollope and John Galsworthy aren’t as popular with readers as Jane Austen and Charles Dickens. They fill in a gap in English history for readers who study history through novels. Galsworthy is well-suited for those who love Downton Abbey, which explains why British television has produced it three times.

Amazon has the Forsyte Collection for 99 cents, which claims to contain everything in 3,355 pages. There are several audiobook editions, but I’m listening to the Naxos editions. Naxos packages the entire story of nine novels using their trilogy names: The Forsyte Saga, A Modern Comedy, and End of the Chapter.

Only the first six novels actually focus on the Forsytes; the last three deal with a distant cousin.

The Forsytes Saga (1967) miniseries has 26 parts, and covers the first six novels and interludes (short stories):

  • The Man of Property
  • In Chancery
  • To Let
  • The White Monkey
  • The Silver Spoon
  • Swan Song

The Forsyte Saga (2002) miniseries has 10 parts, and only covers the first three novels and interludes (short stories):

  • The Man of Property
  • In Chancery
  • To Let

The latest television version, The Forsytes (2025), had only six episodes in its first season and covered only part of The Man of Property. It had been renewed for seasons 2 and 3. For some reason, it changes the story from the books and the two other television series. I don’t recommend starting with this series, even though it has the most elaborate production.

I recommend watching the 1967 series, which is in black-and-white. The only place I could find it was on YouTube. Among the stars were two of my favorites, Kenneth More and Susan Hampshire.

As far as I can remember, only Soames, Irene, and Winifred appear in all six of the first novels that focus on the Forsyte family from the 1880s until 1926. It involves at least ten love stories and eight marriages. It begins in Victorian times, spans the Edwardian, through World War I, and into the Jazz Age.

The 26 episodes of The Forsyte Saga reminded me a great deal of the 26 episodes of The Pallisers, which is based on six novels by Anthony Trollope. It made me wonder if Galsworthy was a fan of Trollope. But it also reminded me of the 12-volume novel series, Dance to the Music of Time by Anthony Powell, and the four-part TV series of the same name. These English writers like to span generations, combining character drama and British history.

Although there are plenty of reasons to hate Soames Forsyte, I found him a fascinating character. I was very sympathetic to Irene Forsyte, but I also wanted to condemn her. I both liked and disliked Jon and Fleur. In the 1967 version, Fleur was played by Susan Hampshire. It’s hard to judge the faults of a character played by such a beautiful actress.

I’ve already seen the 2002 version twice, and I’m looking forward to watching it again. According to WatchNow, it’s available on Netflix and PBS. Damian Lewis portrays Soames wonderfully. The character is so unlikable, yet over time, you develop great sympathy for the poor man.

Unfortunately, I haven’t taken to the new 2025 version, although I will give it another viewing. The actors all look too young and beautiful. The costumes, sets, and production are luscious. Visually, it reminds me of HBO’s The Gilded Age. The latest big historical dramas all seem to be revising the past, so everyone is young and beautiful. I really appreciated all the genuinely old-looking characters in the 1967 version.

The miniseries focuses on romantic relationships. The novels also explore many other kinds of relationships. Soames and his father. Soames and his uncles and aunts. Soames with his brothers and sisters. Soames is the patron of Philip the artist. But they are also romantic rivals for Irene. In the second trilogy, A Modern Comedy, the novels focus on Soames’ relationship with his daughter Fleur. In the second trilogy, we see Soames in several business and political relationships. And we see Soames’ relationship to art – he’s a collector of paintings.

And this is just the connections of Soames. There is an intense relationship between Old Jolyon, Young Jolyon, and his son Jolly. We encounter even more relationships with their wives and lovers. Young Jolyon is Soames’s first cousin, and the two families have several overlapping relationships.

The story focuses on marriage from Victorian times through the Jazz Age. To the first and second generations of Forystes, marriage was about improving the Forsyte holdings. Soames twice marries poor, beautiful women who come to despise him. Intense love fails other couples. In the first six novels, I can only recall one marriage where love succeeds.

I’ve read enough about Galsworthy to know that the complicated Forsytes were somewhat inspired by his own family. And Galsworthy stole his wife, Ada, from his cousin, and they lived unmarried for several years, hiding the scandal from his father. After his father died, his cousin divorced Ada, and Galsworthy married her. This is paralleled with Jolyon and Soames.

In other words, there is great depth in these novels that makes The Forsytes worth reproducing for television. And it should encourage fans to read the novels.

JWH